Chesterton begins this chapter by
talking about “complete self confidence” as a moral failing. He describes an
incident where a friend’s innocent remark prompted him to give the following
response.
Shall
I tell you where the men are who believe most in themselves? For I can tell
you. I know of men who believe in themselves more colossally than Napoleon or
Caesar. I know where flames the fixed star of certainty and success. I can
guide you to the thrones of the Superman. The men who really believe in
themselves are all in lunatic asylums. (7-8)
I like to think of Chesterton
literally saying all this exactly as it is written down, complete with
Shakespeare reference and transposed sentence structure, while the publisher’s
eyes roll back in his skull and he begins wondering what urgent engagement of
his can possibly take place within the next twenty minutes.
Actually the publisher does ask the
pertinent question of whether all people everywhere who believe in themselves
are actually in lunatic asylums. And Chesterton agrees that, sure, some have
escaped that fate. But they’re all bores, debtors, failures, drunks and general
“rotters.” (9) He urges his friend to consider humans in terms of his “business
sense” instead of this “ugly individualistic philosophy” (9) (btw real charming
move there, Chesterton). And for the rest of the paragraph he pretty much goes
on to say that believing in yourself is the most sinful and stupidest thing you
can possibly do.
(At the end of the conversation,
the friend supposedly asks Chesterton “If a man is not to believe in himself,
in what is he to believe?” which I don’t think happened. I think the friend
said something more like, “Um….I just remembered my wife is in the hospital and
I have an urgent meeting with my boss and my kid’s soccer game is happening
literally right now.”)
Now, Chesterton muddies the waters
a bit when he brings up “complete self confidence” for about a sentence, and
then goes back to talking about regular old “believing in oneself.” So I’m not
whether he’s telling us to avoid self confidence that goes to an unrealistic
extreme, or if we’re just supposed to be doubting ourselves all the time.
I agree that “believe in yourself”
doesn’t really mean anything when you don’t have the skill to back it up. On
the other hand, I think negative thinking can really bite you in the butt and
make you screw up even when things were going fine. So it’s better to focus on
what you can do.
But this anecdote is more of a lead
up to the chapter than a main point. Chesterton goes on to talk about the
necessity of accepting original sin as a starting point for talking about the
human condition. He goes on for a couple of paragraphs about how totally obvious
sin is and how everyone has always believed in it since forever, without ever
really giving us a definition for sin, or naming any theologians (besides one
counter example).
The one sinful act he does mention
is “skinning a cat” for fun (10) so I guess Chesterton is just talking about
how humans tend to do really bad stuff for no reason. People doing bad stuff is
important to talk about, but Chesterton glosses over the different
interpretations people have to explain why people are this way. It’s all “sin.”
His argument here is pretty much that either people are sinful, people are
crazy, or you’re in denial.
Now, Plato also worked on teasing
out the nuance between knowledge and virtue in his dialog Meno. So looking at
the intersection between mental health and good behavior is nothing new.
However, I am a little disappointed in the lack of nuance Chesterton gives in
his view of sin. System and culture, two huge factors for human behavior, get
left out entirely.
For example, we would judge the
skinning cat man less harshly if he was hungry and elated at the idea of eating
some fresh kitty (although the cat might not agree). He’s still bad, but if
he’s a homeless guy with few food options, he’s not acting for the same reasons
as a sociopath who tortures animals for fun. In another case, the skinning cat
man might see a Christian father spanking a six-month-old and be totally
shocked. In his culture, animal cruelty is fine, but hitting babies no matter
what the context is evil.
Not that either of these two cases
take out the idea of sin. They just locate sin away from the heart of the
individual (as some inexplicable force that makes humans mean) and into the
world in general as a thing that makes human relationships go wrong and demands
an extra portion of virtue to combat. The problem with the skinning cat analogy
is it’s too “other.” No one reading Chesterton actually likes skinning cats. So
it’s very easy to skim the paragraph and think, “Oh, yes. Sin is a big
problem…For other people.”
In the next few paragraphs,
Chesterton takes up the idea of madness, saying that madness might look
interesting from the outside but from the inside it’s very dull:
A
blind man may be picturesque; but it requires two eyes to see the picture. (9)
(I got news for you, Chesterton,
blind people are generally pretty sane and have average artistic sensibility in
concepts other than sight. But carry on.)
The idea of madness being reminds
me most of the memoir I Never Promised
You a Rose Garden, about a teenage girl with Schizophrenia. In many ways,
the world in her head is fantastical, with gods and visions and beautiful
landscapes. But it’s fundamentally a world of punishments and traps that she
built to mirror the real world. When she begins to recover, she is amazed by
the beauty of the real world.
Chesterton also defends the use of
an every-person narrator in literature—a relatable hero who experiences weird
shit (Labyrinth, anyone?). I think this is kind of a matter of taste, though.
I’m not a huge fan of sociopathic narrators, but I do like ones that are a bit
quirky, like Cassandra in I Capture the
Castle.
Over pages 10 and 11, Chesterton
defends imagination as a normal part of human life. He rejects the idea that
imagination and mysticism cause people to go crazy. This is an argument people
still need to hear today. Going back to I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, the
author says in the afterward,
The
promulgation of this myth makes creative people reluctant to seek needed
therapy because they fear their gifts will vanish. It also makes mentally ill
people fear invoking what creative forces they have for fear of deepening their
already substantial anguish.
Both Joanne Greenburg and
Chesterton agree that art is not the cause of madness; instead it can be a
powerful tool in the recovery of mental health (although Greenburg emphasizes
the communal aspect of art more).
Chesterton does sprinkle some weird
comments in these pages. Such as “Odd
people are always complaining of the dullness of life” (10) (it depends on what
kind of odd people), “poets do not go mad, but chess players [and
mathematicians] do,” (10) (what do you have against chess???) and, “only one
great English poet went mad” (11). With the benefit of Google, Chesterton might
have heard of Sir Thomas Wyatt or Lord Byron.
In conclusion, Chesterton makes
artistic sensibility, which enjoys the world, opposed to logical or scientific
thought, which analyzes the world.
The poet only asks to get his head
into the heavens. It is the logician who seeks to get the heavens into his
head. And it is his head that splits. (11)
Chesterton spends the rest of page
12 and 13 explaining that an overabundance of reason is what makes people go
mad, because then people don’t have any imagination or humility. Which seems
very odd to me. I really don’t think you have to lose your imagination to be a
good scientist. Hell, it’s because
people see world as strange and wonderful that they want to study it. As
Richard Dawkins said,
Isn't it sad to go to your grave without ever wondering why
you were born? Who, with such a thought, would not spring from bed, eager to
resume discovering the world and rejoicing to be part of it?
But in Chesterton’s
world a skeptic and atheist can’t feel the joy of being alive. It only took me
two minutes on Google to find that quote.
In pages 14 and 15,
Chesterton goes on to describe a kind of person who’s arguments make perfect
logical sense in that they are perfectly consistent but which fail to encompass
the complexities of reality.
“A small circle is
quite as infinite as a large circle; but…it is not so large. In the same way
the insane explanation is quite as complete as the sane one, but it is not so
large.” (14)
Which actually does
sound like a real type of person. I’ve listened to debates with the
presuppositionalist theologian Sye Ten Bruggencate, for example. His schtick is
that if you just assume God is always right and humans are just too stupid and
sinful to understand, then everything makes sense. Why is there evil in the
world? Phhh. Don’t question God. That’s sinful. Just agree that God’s plan is
perfect, and everything by definition will be perfect.
However, while these
types of jerks usually pay lip service to logic, I don’t think they abound more
within scientific communities necessarily. Sure, they will assume they alone
are totally rational while everyone else is influenced by emotion, while
simultaneously being totally blind to their own raging ego. But that just
sounds more like your run-of-the-mill asshole than some scientist run amok.
Assholes use science as an excuse to justify their own whims. They’re not
actually interested in discovering everything. Being a scientist actually
requires a certain amount of humility. You have to be willing to put aside your
prejudices and listen to the facts, even when they prove you wrong.
I find it ironic that
at this point the ultra orthodox Chesterton is babbling on about modern
science, while I’m just shrugging and going “People are assholes. Didn’t you
notice?” It’s sort of like we switched positions.
Then Chesterton
spends the rest of the chapter talking about the materialist worldview in a way
that makes it clear he has never talked to any real materialists. He keeps
referencing Joseph McCabe but never actually quotes him. (Google tells me
McCabe had a strange obsession with “ether.”) His main argument is that
materialists are all crazy (“I am not now discussing the relation of these
creeds to truth, but…their relation to health” (18)) and a purely material
universe is boring (“if the cosmos of the materialist is the real cosmos, it is
not much of a cosmos” (18)).
The interesting thing
is that a lot of the materialists I’ve listened to or read have pretty open
minds about the supernatural. It’s not that “they are not allowed to admit into
[their] spotless machine the slightest speck of spiritualism or miracle” (19).
More: “OMG You have a real speck of miracle????? Let me see it! Let’s run tests
on it! Stop the presses! I’m so freakin’ excited cuz this changes
everything!!!!!” As the skeptic blogger Seth Andrews is fond of saying, “Show
me the evidence.” Many people adopt a materialistic worldview not because they
don’t think the supernatural could possibly exist, but simply because it’s a
waste of time to look for supernatural solutions to problems when material
causes and solutions are so much more logical and useful.
Later on the same
page, Chesterton sells his own religion short with a weird analogy.
Spiritual doctrines
do not actually limit the mind as do materialistic denials. Even if I believe
in immortality I need not think about it. But if I disbelieve in immortality I
must not think about it. (19)
This is diametrically
opposed to everything I heard in church growing up. What comes after death was
the entire driving force behind every sermon and Sunday school lesson. We kids
were obsessed with getting out of hell and viewed it as our first duty to force
people have the kind of faith that would save them as well. We very much “need”
to think about it.
And for the next few
pages Chesterton goes on about fatalism and determinism and how you can’t
possibly have free with without an omnipotent god who foresees everything
because that makes a ton of sense…Supposedly
materialist beliefs,
…right or wrong, they
gradually destroy…humanity; I do not mean only kindness, I mean hope, courage,
poetry, initiative, all that is human. (19)
(Did Chesterton just
admit he thinks the materialists might be right?)
Basically Chesterton
waxes dull on the evil of materialism for another couple of pages. And then he
gets into “Eastern” symbolism taken up by “many moderns:” the circle, which
Chesterton calls “the very symbol of this ultimate nullity.” (22) For example,
the serpent eating its tail (which supposedly the moderns use to represent
infinity) is “a degraded animal who destroys even himself.” (22)
Quick! To the
Wikipedia!
The snake eating its
tail is Ouroboros, and represents self-reflexivity, introspection, and
cyclicality. It originally came from Egypt, but has been used in Indian and
Greek philosophy, and Norse legends, as well as Gnosticism and Alchemy. Not
strictly an “Eastern” symbol, and not only a symbol of infinity.
But we can be sure
that circles are an entirely pagan symbol and completely unfit for Christian
thought. As a debased sultan once wrote in his barbaric rhymes,
That circle which appeared—in my poor style—
Like a reflected radiance in Thee,
After my eyes had studied it awhile,
Within, and in its own hue, seemed to be
Tinted with the figure of a Man…
Whoops. That was
Dante Alighieri, Paradise canto 33 lines 127-131.
And here in a
nutshell is the problem with using symbols. Symbols carry meaning because of
their interpretation. Chesterton’s earlier analogy of a closed mind being like
a circle works because he takes a neutral shape and draws a comparison that
clarifies his. He doesn’t just say, “madmen are like circles, and by the way circles
are Eastern and eeeeevil!” like he’s doing here.
And then the rest of
the chapter is all about the importance of mysticism, which we already read
about in the introduction, with some added stuff about embracing contradictions.
It’s kind of thrown in at the end of the chapter, so I won’t go into it in too
much detail.
The ordinary man…has
always cared more for truth than for consistency. If he saw two truths that
seemed to contradict each other, he would take the two truths and the
contradiction along with them. (23)
My best guess is that
Chesterton is talking about the variety of lived experience here. Like, “I’m
straight and attracted to men, but my friend is bi and in a relationship with a
woman. That’s weird to me but I’m not going to deny her relationship because
the evidence is right in front of me.”
And he closes with
some more “I don’t think you know how symbols work.”
“Buddhism is
centripetal, but Christianity is centrifugal.” (23) I think on the first day of
classes Chesterton stumbled into a physics class while thinking it was Religion
101 and never figured out his mistake. Also centrifugal force is just applied
inertia.
And, “The cross…can
extend its four arms for ever without altering its shape. Because it has a
paradox in its centre it can grow without changing…the cross opens its arms to
the four winds; it is a signpost for free travelers.” (24)
You know what the
cross is a symbol of? DON’T FUCK WITH ROME.
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